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the historically dominant northern economies. Given the 
nature of demand in low-income southern economies, 
it is likely to be reflected in sustained demand for 
commodities, with other southern economy producers in 
global value chains being forced into lower levels of value 
added. Standards are likely to be of considerably reduced 
significance in value chains feeding into China and India.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The first decade of the twenty-first century arguably marks a significant structural 
shift in the global economy. Since the early 19th century, the historic dominance of 
China and India as contributors to global output was increasingly undermined by the 
rapid deepening of industrialization, initially in England, then spreading to Western 
and Northern Europe, North America, Japan and the South East Asian newly 
industrializing economies. The latter phase of this dominance of the global economy 
by predominantly “northern” economies was marked by deepening globalization with 
an increasing number of producers in low-income economies participating in global 
value chains involving the increasing fragmentation of production and specialization 
of tasks. This latter period was also characterized by the accelerated growth of the 
financial sector.  
 
From the mid 1980s this historical trajectory of northern dominance began to wane, 
driven by two sets of inter-related developments. The first was the very rapid growth 
of productive capabilities in the two large Asian Driver economies, China and India 
(www.asianDrivers.open.ac.uk). The second was the growth of structural weaknesses 
in many of the key previously dominant northern economies which resulted in a major 
financial meltdown in 2008, with an accompanying fall in global (especially in the 
northern economies) output. If these two trends are sustained, this will have a major 
impact on the locale of production and consumption in the global economy in the 21st 
century. But what impact will this potential change in global growth trajectories have 
on low-income producers participating in global value chains? 
 
This paper addresses two sets of issues. The first concerns the nature of the structural 
imbalances in the global economy which leads us to believe that there will be a 
decisive shift in the dominance of production and consumption from Europe, North 
America and Japan to China and India in the coming decades (Section 3). Working on 
this presumption, Section 4 addresses the distinctive nature of consumption in the 
Asian Driver economies, and considers the likely impact this will have for southern 
producers who participate in global value chains which feed into southern, as opposed 
to northern, final markets. Before undertaking these two sets of analysis, Section 2 
problematizes the importance of focusing on demand in the evolution of global value 
chains. Section 5 concludes by reviewing the main implications of these potential 
shifts for low-income countries’ participation in global value chains. 
2. BUYERS, MARKETS AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
Until the late 1950s, economic growth was largely explained by the quantum of 
available labor, land and the investment, and growth was assumed to occur at the 
extensive margin. High savings-investment rates were at the center of the Harrod-
Domar family of growth models which informed development policy in the 
immediate post-war period. However, the “discovery” by Solow in the 1950s that an 
increase in the volume of productive inputs accounted for only around 87.5 percent of 
economic growth in the US increasingly shifted the focus of attention in growth 
models from the extensive to the intensive margin (Solow, 1957). The improvement 
in the quality of productive inputs has thus risen to center stage.  
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Both the emphasis on the extensive and intensive margins reflects a preoccupation in 
growth theory and development policy with factors determining the augmentation of 
supply. However, in recent years, we have become increasingly aware of the role 
which demand plays in economic growth, and its derived impact on the growth of 
supply capabilities.  
 
A key demand-related factor affecting economic growth is the size and rate of market 
growth. Rapidly expanding and large markets both spur productivity growth by 
allowing for scale economies in production (Verdoorns Law) and send a signal to 
producers that they can have confidence in investing for the future. It leads to a 
virtuous circle of growth and innovation, and is particularly influential in the context 
of very large domestic markets, or when producers sell into global markets. 
 
But, it is not just the volume and rate of demand growth which affects productivity 
and capabilities. The nature of demand also has a significant impact on capabilities, 
and the returns to alternative patterns of production. Around the late 1960s, there was 
an important transition in final markets in the northern economies (Piore and Sabel, 
1984). Once post World War Two reconstruction had been achieved and basic needs 
of most consumers had been met, consumers became increasingly discerning about 
the products they consumed. They demanded higher levels of quality, much greater 
product differentiation and faster rates of product innovation. In the context of this 
change in the pattern of demand, the ideal archetype in production organization 
moved from mass production to mass customization (Pine, 1993), in which producers 
developed the capabilities to meet different critical success factors (CSFs) in 
proliferating and dynamic market segments. Variety and flexibility – with little trade-
off in costs – became the name of the game in competitive production. 
 
A direct consequence of this search for low-cost flexibility was a transition in 
production organization, from “just-in-case” mass-production to “just-in-time” lean 
production (Kaplinsky, 1994; Womack and Jones, 1996). A series of related changes 
in quality-procedures (with “zero-defects” becoming an essential building block of 
just-in-time production) and reduced batch-size, coupled with the drive by firms to 
concentrate on their core competences meant that lead firms were required to take 
responsibility for the systemic efficiency of their increasingly global value chains 
(GVCs) (Gereffi, 1994). One important component of the tool-box which this entailed 
was the development of standards in production, often usefully summarized as QCD. 
The Q stood for standards over quality (increasingly measured in parts per million), 
the C for cost (annual reductions in price paid to suppliers) and D for delivery (more 
frequent deliveries in smaller batches).  
 
Most of these standards were firm-specific. But in some cases industry-specific 
standards were also developed as the outcome of collaboration between private sector 
firms searching for competitive advantage. Increasingly, too, standards were 
introduced to foster the capabilities of suppliers to meet the new requirements of lean 
production, notably the cross-sector ISO9000 quality procedures, and subsequently 
ISO14000 environmental standards. The development and extension of these process 
standards began in the Japanese auto industry in the 1960s and then gradually spread 
to the global electronics sector and then more widely and rapidly to many sectors in 
subsequent decades. By the end of the twentieth century, these private sector 
standards had become an integral component in most GVCs feeding production into 
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global markets, particularly for intermediate and final consumption goods 
characterized by variety.  
 
A further development of standards reflected a different process, one in which the key 
Drivers were final consumers and the state concerned with consumer welfare, rather 
than private sector firms searching for competitive advantage. In some cases, 
standards were set by governments to promote product safety, particularly in the food 
sector. But, increasingly, consumers’ organizations became concerned with the 
processes involved in producing products to meet their needs, requiring fair returns to 
producers (FairTrade) and organic certification.  
 
Figure 1 summarizes the growing complexity of these standards, covering both 
product and process, and involving various types of codification including both 
private and public sectors. 
 
Figure 1: Drivers of Standards Over Process and Product 
 By Firms  By Governments By Civil Society 
 
Product 
Quality standards such 
as permitted parts per 
million defects 
Food hygiene standards 
 
Lead content in toys 
Organic products 
 
 
 
Process 
Quality control 
procedures – such as 
ISO9000 
 
Frequency of on-time 
delivery 
Hygiene standards – such 
as Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point 
conformance (HACCP) 
 
Traceability of pesticide 
content 
Sustainability standards – 
such as FSC (Forest 
Stewardship Council) 
(timber) 
 
Child labor standards 
 
 
How have the producers inserted in GVCs been informed about the growing 
prevalence and the nature of these evolving standards? Where the supply function has 
been internalized within a diversified firm, it has been the firm which has driven the 
standards through its subsidiaries. And to the extent that the large firm has focused on 
the systemic efficiency of its value chain (as, for example, in the Japanese auto 
industry during the 1980s, Cusumano, 1985), it has driven standards to its suppliers 
through supply chain management procedures, usually informing suppliers of the 
standards they are required to achieve, and in some cases also assisting them to 
achieve these standards (Bessant, Kaplinsky and Lamming, 2003). But in a growing 
number of GVCs, suppliers have often been left to make their own way in identifying 
the core relevant standards, and in establishing the procedures required to meet these 
standards. It is in these sectors that global buyers have come to play an important role. 
By defining the role played by individual parties in the chain, the buyers can also 
block the upgrading paths of producers. 
 
If we relate these functions performed by global buyers to the challenge of capability-
building, the story becomes a little more complicated. In order to understand these 
complexities we need to decompose what we mean by the “upgrading” implicit in the 
concept of “capabilities”. Arising out of the GVC approach is an augmentation of the 
understanding in the innovation literature which has historically been predominantly 
focused on process-upgrading, with an ancillary focus on product-upgrading. The 
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GVC framework, recognizing the centrality of dynamic rents to the global 
fragmentation and relocation of economic activity (Kaplinsky, 2005) distinguishes 
four types of upgrading activity (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). The first two are 
familiar to the innovation literature – upgrading of process and product. The third is 
central to the GVC approach, referring to the upgrading of function. That is, firms 
may change their positioning in the chain, perhaps moving from physical 
transformation to design or marketing. Often, as in Figure 2, there is a hierarchy in 
this process of upgrading as firms move from assembly, to manufacturing-
transformation, to design and to branding (or often a combination of these functions). 
In mature chains, when firms have developed capabilities, they may also upgrade by 
moving to a new chain. 
 
Figure 2: Is There a Hierarchy of Upgrading? 
 Process 
Upgrading 
Product  
Upgrading 
Functional  
Upgrading 
Chain  
Upgrading 
 
Trajectory 
 
 
 
Examples Original 
equipment 
assembly (OEA) 
 
 
Original 
equipment 
manufacture 
OEM 
 
 
 
Original 
design 
manufacture 
 
 
 
 
 
Original 
brand 
manufacture 
 
 
 
Moving chains 
– e.g. from 
black and white 
TV tubes to 
computer 
monitors 
Degree of 
disembodied 
activities 
Disembodied content of value added increases progressively 
 
 
Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001. 
 
The reason why these categories of upgrading are important is that the buyers, who 
have a key role to play in informing suppliers of market requirements, have their own 
interests to protect and will generally limit the upgrading path of their suppliers. 
Buyers naturally are focused on protecting their own rents in the chain and will 
therefore “guide” and often limit through contractual conditions, the upgrading path 
of suppliers. The nature of these constraints on upgrading will depend on the 
particular competences of the buyers. For example, in the global furniture value chain 
large global buyers such as IKEA will allow, and indeed foster, process upgrading by 
their suppliers which reduces cost. But, at the same time, they will zealously guard the 
design and branding functions and keep these functions off-limits to suppliers 
(Kaplinsky, Morris and Readman, 2002). The more variety and brand-conscious 
markets are, the more likely that lead chain buyers will strive to maintain their control 
over design and branding. 
 
Of course, the understanding of capability-growth must reflect both supply and 
demand factors. But it also will reflect the interaction between these two sets of 
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factors. For example, responding to a series of analyses on the growth of supply 
capabilities in the newly-industrializing-economies, Feenstra and Hamilton point to 
the role played by the US retail sector in the evolving east Asian “export miracle”. 
They show how the growing concentration of buying power in the US during the 
1960s led to intense competition to find low-cost high-volume sources of supply 
(Feenstra and Hamilton, 2005). This led Walmart and other large retail chains to 
actively foster the growth of supply capabilities in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, a process extended to Chinese and other global 
suppliers in the 1980s and 1990s. This doved-in with the simultaneous investment in 
the supply of capabilities by governments and producers in these NIEs (Wade, 1990; 
Amsden, 1989). 
 
In summary, therefore, although economic growth is ultimately a story of augmented 
supply capabilities, there has been growing recognition of the key role which final 
markets play in inducing this growth in supply capabilities. Market size and market 
growth are one part of this story. But another part involves the nature of final markets, 
and the role which this plays in guiding the direction of capability growth amongst 
suppliers. Intermediation into final markets, and therefore the nature of buying power 
in global markets, is a further factor affecting economic growth, particularly in 
economies in which external trade plays a key role. 
 
3. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE SOUTHERN DRIVERS OF 
DEMAND GROWTH 
  
The recession following the financial crisis of autumn 2008 sparked the largest fall in 
output in the north since WW2, with an associated decline in output and exports in 
many low-income economies, including the stellar-growth economies in east and 
south Asia. Between the onset of the crisis and the first quarter of 2009, global output 
fell by 2.4 percent, and that in the OECD fell by four percent (Holland et al, 2009). 
The unknown issue (at the point of writing, December 2009), is how this crisis will 
unfold and whether and how it will be resolved. 
 
Essentially two major schools of analysis and policy response dominate the public 
debate on the evolution and resolution of the crisis. (Krugman amusingly refers to 
these schools in the US context as comprising of “saltwater” economists on the east 
and west coasts, and the “freshwater“ economists in Chicago and other interior 
universities - Krugman, 2009). On the one hand, the “saltwater” Keynesians who have 
dominated policy responses argue that a necessary transitory mechanism is 
government financing to sustain demand growth and prevent a downward spiral of 
confidence and economic activity. On the other hand, the “freshwater” mainstream 
economists are suspicious of big government, and fearful that deficit-financing will 
induce inflation, and argue for a very rapid rebalancing of government budgets. 
 
What is missing from this polarized debate is a structural analysis of the crisis, and it 
is this which we need to understand in order to assess the likely role played by China 
and other large southern economies in the coming decade and beyond. Before 
presenting this structural analysis, it is helpful to think through a number of possible 
outcomes to the current financial and economic crisis. The first outcome is the “V 
scenario” – a rapid downturn followed by a fairly rapid upturn. At the time of writing 
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in late 2009, growth is beginning to revive in the US and parts of Europe, as well as in 
China and elsewhere in Asia, and this is the positive (or rather, the “least negative” 
hoped-for outcome). The “U scenario” (sometimes described as the “bath scenario” 
when the upturn is delayed) suggests a similar outcome, but with a more protracted 
dip. Less comfortable is the W scenario – a double dip growth path, but with a 
subsequent revival to past growth trajectories. This is an outcome considered more 
realistic by some, such as the CEO of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The most 
pessimistic outcome to the financial crisis is that it will follow the same path as that 
experienced by Japan after its financial bubble burst in the early 1990s, that is, a sharp 
downturn followed by a protracted period of stagnation. This is the “L scenario”. 
Somewhere between the L and the W scenarios is “square root scenario” ( ), that 
is a sharp downturn, followed by a small rise (consistent with the revival of activity in 
late 2009), followed by a period of protracted stagnation. A recent study supports this 
likely outcome – “we expect growth to resume by the end of [2009] in most countries, 
[but] the level of output in the OECD will remain permanently lower” (Holland et al, 
2009: 9).  
 
It is important, however, to avoid treating the global economy as a homogeneous 
entity and recognize the possibility – we believe likelihood – of diverse regional 
outcomes. The structural analysis which follows contrasts the likely outcome in the 
northern economies (Section 3.1) with that in two key southern economies, the Asian 
Driver economies of China and India (Section 3.2). 
3.1. Structural Crisis in the North 
High rates of global economic growth during the 1990s and the first decade of the 
new century were essentially fuelled by high rates of consumption in key northern 
economies, particularly in the large economies of the US, the UK and Spain, as well 
as in some smaller economies such as Ireland, Greece and Iceland. In each of these 
cases, this consumption boom was made possible through a series of financial 
bubbles, particularly in housing which allowed consumers to drawn on the “wealth” 
arising from inflating house prices. This resulted in two sets of related phenomena – 
falling rates of household and personal savings (in some cases falling into dis-savings) 
and a rise in balance of payments deficits. These deficits in external payments were 
filled by large payments’ surpluses in key exporting economies, particularly China, 
Japan and Germany, made possible by restrained personal consumption arising from 
high rates of personal (and in recent years, corporate) savings and/or low rates of 
consumption.  
 
 
Table 1: Country Current Account Balance (Percent of Country GDP) 
 Brazil India China Germany Japan Spain UK USA 
1985 -0.1 -1.8 -3.7 2.5 3.8 1.6 0.7 -3.0 
1990 -0.8 -2.2 3.4 2.8 1.5 -3.5 -3.9 -1.4 
2000 -3.8 -1.0 1.7 -1.7 2.6 -4.0 -2.7 -4.3 
2005 1.6 -1.0 7.2 5.1 3.6 -7.4 -2.6 -5.9 
2008 -1.7 -1.0 11.0 6.7 3.2 -9.6 -2.8 -4.7 
Source: Calculated from OECD Database, accessed November 2009. 
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Table 1 shows the extent of external payments deficits and surpluses in key large 
trading economies. The two most notable cases are the largest deficit economy, the 
US (its payments deficit hovered around five percent of GDP) and China (whose 
payments surplus in 2008 was 11 percent of GDP). Also notable is the case of Spain 
(deficit of almost 10 percent of GDP in 2008) and the UK (a deficit almost three 
percent of GDP). Some of the other smaller OECD economies showed even greater 
trade deficits, notably Greece (15 percent of GDP) and Iceland (40 percent of GDP in 
2008). A significant feature of this performance was the growth in these structural 
imbalances during the 2000s. 
 
Table 2: Savings and Household Consumption Expenditure  
(Percent of Country GDP) 
 
Gross Domestic 
Savings 
Household Final consumption 
expenditure 
Savings to Consumption 
Ratio 
Brazil 
1990 21 59 0.36 
2000 16 64 0.26 
2008 19 61 0.31 
China 
1990 40 46 0.86 
2000 38 47 0.80 
2008 49 37 1.34 
India 
1990 23 66 0.35 
2000 23 64 0.36 
2008 33 56 0.59 
Germany 
1990 23 58 0.40 
2000 22 59 0.38 
2007 25 57 0.45 
Japan 
1990 34 53 0.65 
2000 27 56 0.48 
2006 25 57 0.44 
Spain 
1990 23 60 0.38 
2000 23 60 0.39 
2007 25 57 0.44 
United Kingdom 
1990 18 62 0.29 
2000 16 65 0.25 
2007 15 63 0.24 
United States 
1990 16 67 0.24 
2000 17 69 0.24 
2006 14 70 0.20 
Source: Compiled from World Development Indicators accessed November 2009. 
 
Table 2 shows the disparities in savings and consumption rates which underpinned 
these structural trade imbalances. The striking characteristics of this data are, first, the 
relatively low rates of final household consumption expenditure in China and, second, 
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the high rate of private consumption (especially compared to low rate of savings) in 
three key bubble economies, Spain, the UK and the US. Concomitant with these 
imbalances has been the growth of foreign exchange reserves in the two leading 
surplus economies (China and Japan), which together accounted for nearly half of 
total global foreign exchange reserves (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$ Millions) 2009 
 Country ($ Millions) 
% of World 
Total 
 World (sum of all countries) 7,520,566  
2009 China (including Hong Kong) 2,292,300 30% 
2009 Japan 1,044,327 14% 
2008 
Eurozone (EU member states which have 
adopted the EURO, incl. ECB) 569,213 8% 
2008 India 313,354 4% 
2009 Brazil 223,713 3% 
2008 Germany 150,377 2% 
2008 United Kingdom 99,956 1% 
2008 United States 67,000 1% 
Source: The SWF Institute, accessed November 2009 (www.swfinstitute.org). 
The imbalances in trade – feeding off the financial bubble – represents a core 
structural feature which is unsustainable in the medium and long term, particularly for 
very large global economies such as the US and China. To be resolved they require 
either (or a combination of) a reduction in consumption in the surplus economies, or a 
rise in consumption in the deficit economies, resulting in a fall in net exports in 
surplus economies and a rise in net exports in the deficit countries. These changes 
may work their way through the system through changes in exchange rates, personal 
consumption expenditure and government expenditure, and may or may not involve 
price deflation or inflation. The precise mechanisms involved in the resolution of the 
imbalances are less important for our discussion than the level of output and output 
growth in which the structural rebalancing will be achieved. 
 
Some changes are already occurring. Thus household savings rates are beginning to 
rise, with consumption falling and trade deficits narrowing in key deficit economies. 
At the same time, payments surpluses have been falling in some economies, including 
China (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Changes in Trade and Savings for Major Economies (2008-2009) 
 
Current Account 
Balance 
(Percent of GDP) 
Gross National 
Savings 
(Percent of GDP) 
Trade 
(% Change in $ value June 
2008/09 YOY) 
 2008 20091 2008 20091 Imports Exports 
Germany 6.4 2.9 26 20 33 34 
Japan 3.2 1.9 27 23 26 24 
United 
Kingdom -1.7 -2.0 15 12 31 31 
United States -4.9 -2.6 13 11 24 -0.29 
Source: Calculated from IMF World Economic Outlook and DOTS Database, 
accessed November 2009. 
1 Estimated by the IMF WEO. 
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However, the outcome of falling consumption in most northern economies has been a 
sharp rise in unemployment almost everywhere, with aggregate employment in the 
OECD falling by 2.2m between the 2nd quarters of 2008 and 2009 (Holland, et al, 
2009), and unemployment growing to exceed 10 percent of the labor force in the US 
in late 2009. It has also led to a sharp fall in exports in major surplus economies 
(Table 4). In June 2009 Germany’s exports had declined by 34 percent and Japan’s by 
24 percent compared to the same period in the previous year. China, too, saw a fall in 
employment after global trade fell significantly in the first year after the financial 
melt-down (13 percent fall in exports between June 08/09). 
 
This decrease in output in the north, and increase in unemployment - both arising out 
of falling personal consumption - have been met by a massive “saltwater Keynesian” 
injection of funds through bank-bailouts and quantitative easing in most of the deficit 
economies, fuelling a “freshwater” response warning of the dangers of inflation. 
Although not historically unprecedented, government debt as a share of GDP has 
risen sharply in almost all economies as actual (and projected) fiscal deficits have 
grown (Table 5). Without this growth in government expenditure, there is little doubt 
that the already almost unprecedentedly large fall in output and rise in unemployment 
would have been substantially greater. As a result, there has been some revival in 
economic activity, with both the US and the EU (but not the UK) moving out of 
recession (in the sense that output stopped falling) in the final quarter of 2009 and a 
revival of China’s exports. Virtually no observer doubts the reflationary consequences 
of government deficit-financing – the debate is on the sustainability and long-term 
consequence of this deficit spending program and the extent of the economic revival. 
 
Table 5: General Government Fiscal Balance (Percent of GDP) 
Country Germany Japan Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
1980 -3 -5 -2 -3 -3 
1990 -2 2 -4 -2 -4 
2000 1 -8 -1 1 2 
2005 -3 -5 1 -3 -3 
2008 0 -6 -4 -5 -6 
2009 -4 -10 -12 -12 -12 
2010 -5 -10 -12 -13 -10 
2011 -4 -8  -11 -8 
2012 -2 -8  -9 -6 
2013 -1 -8  -8 -7 
2014 0 -8  -7 -7 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, accessed November 2009. Shaded 
areas are estimates. 
We are thus faced with two clear trends in major northern economies. First, personal 
consumption has fallen back and is unlikely to rise in the near-to-mid-term as 
households rebuild their savings and cut personal debt. Second, continued government 
dis-saving has limited the fall in aggregate consumption and output, but it is 
unsustainable in the medium and long term, both for fiscal reasons and because of 
sustained trade deficits. So, the issue is in what other ways can the structural deficits 
in key northern economies be resolved if the past growth trajectory is to be sustained, 
that is if any of the V, U or W scenarios are to be achieved. One possibility is for 
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there to be a rapid growth in consumption and imports in China, Japan, Germany and 
other economies in trade surplus. Here the portents are not positive. Scarred by its 
history of inflation during the 1920s, Germany has made it clear that it wishes to 
minimize deficit financing. It has also explicitly committed itself to remaining an 
economy with a substantial trade surplus. Japan, despite efforts to reflate consumption 
in the past, also does not suggest itself as an economy capable of pulling-in significant 
imports from the deficit economies, and allowing them to benefit from rapid export-
led growth. As a recent IMF Report concluded, “the scope for advanced economies 
such as Germany and Japan to contribute to rebalancing is limited, given their need to 
build savings to prepare for population ageing” (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 
2009:33). So China, and to a lesser extent India, hold the hopes of sustaining the V, U 
or W scenarios. 
 
The problem is that there is little realistic sign that China-led reflation will draw in the 
imports to allow the major deficit economies to resume past levels of consumption 
growth whilst at the same time rebalancing their external payments accounts. It is true 
that the Chinese government has embarked on a major spending program. But, much 
of this has focused on infrastructure and on public services where, in 2009, 
government spending expanded rapidly in health (38 percent), education (24 percent), 
and social safety (22 percent) this year (Source: World Bank China Quarterly Update 
March 2009). These infrastructural expenditures do have derived import requirements 
but, as we will see below, these are unlikely to have a direct first-round impact on the 
exports of the US and the EU. 
 
Of course there are indirect trade multipliers operating in both these forms of 
domestically-oriented expenditure in China, but they are likely to be small in nature, 
at least insofar as they affect the demand for goods and services exported by high-
income northern economies1
 
. Moreover, employment-growth in China has been key 
in sustaining political stability in the face of rising inequality, and insofar as China’s 
labor-intensive exports decline, the emphasis will necessarily be placed on promoting 
domestic production to meet rising consumer demand. In addition, despite China’s 
rapid economic growth and large size, it remains a small player in international trade. 
In 2008, total Chinese demand was equivalent to less than one-quarter of total 
consumption in the US and the EU. All of these factors also apply to India, but since 
its global footprint is smaller than that of China, its capacity to stimulate exports from 
the northern economies is even more limited. 
From this we conclude that beyond the short-term unsustainable deficit financing by 
governments in the large deficit economies, in reality the rebalancing by these 
economies will occur through a reduction in consumption, and hence in imports. We 
should not see this as an historical aberration. Rather, it was the post 1990s boom in 
consumption in the large deficit economies which was aberrant, arising from a series 
of financial bubbles and leading to growing consumption in the (high-income) deficit 
economies being subsidized by high savings in some (low-income) surplus economies 
(notably China and India). We can also anticipate that this fall in northern 
                                            
1  There will, of course be a positive second round general equilibrium impact on high-income 
country exports to those countries whose exports to meet China’s infrastructure investments are 
expanding. But these indirect impacts are likely to be delayed and, moreover, increasingly low-
income countries imports are being sourced from China and India rather than the EU and the 
US. 
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consumption will persist for some time, perhaps even as long as the 18 year post-
bubble recession which the Japanese economy has experienced since 1991. Thus, the 
real issue is whether these northern economies will experience an L or a  
scenario, that is, whether output grows, but below pre-crisis levels before it stabilizes 
and stagnates.  
3.2. Sustained Consumption in the South 
China’s recent growth, at least since the beginning of the 1980s, has been stellar, 
averaging more than nine percent p.a. over the period. India, too, has experienced 
very rapid and sustained growth, albeit only from the early 1990s. It is tempting to see 
these growth trajectories as exceptional, an “economic miracle”. Yet neither of these 
two country’s growth experiences is unique. If we chart the evolution of their growth 
paths – both in relation to output and exports – since the onset of their growth-
inflection, and compare these with the similar experiences of Japan (after 1960) and 
Korea (after 1963), it is evident that other economies have experienced similar 
economic “miracles” in the past (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). What is significant 
about the China-India experience is the size of these economies. Together, Japan and 
Korea never exceeded five percent of the global population. In 2008 China alone 
accounted for 20 percent of the global population and together with India, for almost 
37 percent of the global total. (It is partly for this reason that they are increasingly 
referred to as the “Asian Drivers” – www.asianDrivers.open.ac.uk). 
 
Three key relevant features stand out with regard to the recent growth experience of 
these two Asian Driver economies. The first is that their growth rates have been 
significantly greater than those of the key northern economies. If these past 
trajectories are sustained, then it is estimated that China will be the second largest 
economy by 2016 and India the third largest by 2035 (Goldman Sachs 2001). Of 
course, if past growth relativities are not sustained in the future (for example, if as 
suggested in Section 3.1 above the northern economies experience a protracted period 
of stagnation), then China and India’s relative size will grow in a shorter time span 
than these projections of past performance suggest. Second, both China and India are 
in substantial trade surplus. They do not need to reduce or hold back consumption in 
the same way as do the large northern economies. And, third, by virtue of their large 
size, they have the capacity to grow and realize scale economies by expanding their 
very large domestic markets. An illustration of the size of these Asian Driver markets 
is provided by a recent analysis of the locus of consumption by the global consuming 
class (“the Middle Class”), defined as those consumers with annual incomes of 
between $10 and $100 per day in 2009 (in 2005 PPP $) (Kharas, 2009). Projecting 
forward to 2030 on the basis of growth rates in the past two decades, the center of 
gravity of global consumption shifts decisively (Table 6). The share of Europe and the 
US falls from 64 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2030, whilst that of the south in 
general and Asia in particular, rises. The share of Asia and the Pacific in the global 
consuming class is projected to increase from 23 percent in 2009 to 59 percent in 
2030. Bear in mind, though, that these projections are based on past growth 
relativities. If northern economies do stagnate and the Asian Drivers and the 
surrounding regional economy continues to grow (albeit at a reduced rate), the shift of 
global consumption power to Asia, and to low-income economies in Asia, will be 
accentuated. 
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Table 6: Spending by the Global Middle (Percent of Global GDP in $PPP) 
(2009 to 2030) 
 2009 2030 
N. America 26 10 
Europe 38 20 
C. and S. America 7 6 
Asia Pacific 23 59 
SSA 1 1 
M. East, N. Africa 4 4 
Source: Selected from Table 3, Kharas (2009). 
Nothing guarantees sustained growth in the Asian Driver economies. The fall in 
consumption in the northern deficit economies may be so large that it undermines 
export-oriented growth in China and India, with a potential combination of negative 
multiplier effects on economic activity and political disruption as unemployment 
grows. It may also be that environmental externalities grow so substantially, 
exacerbated by changing and unpredictable climate, that output growth is not 
sustainable. And it may be that global political instability spills over into the Asia-
Pacific region, with a harmful impact on economic growth. So, as in the case of the 
analysis of likely growth paths in the northern economies (Section 3.1), there are clear 
uncertainties in projecting forward, particularly in the context of a disruptive global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless it is our judgment that just as growth is likely to be 
reduced or to stagnate in the northern economies in the future, so growth in Asia in 
general, and in China and India in particular, is likely to be sustained. If nothing else, 
the relativities in growth paths between these two worlds in the past two decades is 
likely to be sustained, and even to increase. If this is the case, then it is important to 
understand the nature of demand in these two large southern Drivers of growth, an 
issue which we now consider. 
 
4. PATTERNS OF DEMAND IN SOUTHERN DRIVERS OF 
GROWTH 
 
Despite differences in country size and endowments, there are well-established paths 
of development through which most economies pass (Kuznets, 1966; Chenery and 
Syrquin, 1975). Low-income economies tend to be agrarian, with the primary sector 
dominating GDP. As incomes rise and manufacturing expands, the industrial sector 
takes over as the major Driver of GDP growth. Continued income growth leads to 
higher demand for services, and at higher income levels it becomes the dominant 
contributor to GDP. These structural shifts represent a well established pattern, 
observed in a large number of countries over time. What interests us in this analysis is 
that in the context of China (and India) becoming the major Driver(s) of global 
demand in the coming decades, what implications the structural shifts in these Asian 
Driver economies have for low-income country exporters in general, and for low-
income country exporters of commodities in particular? Here there are two major 
issues – the structure and the nature of import demand – and in both cases we will 
consider them in relation to the evolution of the Chinese economy. 
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4.1. The Structure of Import Demand  
There are three major consequences of changing economic structures which affect the 
product composition of imports. First, at low per capita incomes, the income elasticity 
of demand for agricultural products in general (and food in particular) is relatively 
high. As incomes rise, the relative income elasticity of demand for manufactures 
grows, and as incomes increase further, the demand for services becomes increasingly 
important in final demand. Second, with the changing sector distribution of GDP, 
there is a shift in labor and employment across sectors. As the industrial sector 
expands, labor and employment migrate from agriculture in the rural areas to the 
manufacturing sector in the cities. Third, as economic output becomes more 
diversified, specialization and interchange grows. Together with the growth of 
urbanization, this requires heavy investments in infrastructure.  
 
These three trends result in a growing demand for commodities. “Soft commodities” 
feed agricultural inputs into food, and provide intermediate inputs (such as cotton and 
timber) into manufacturing. The demand for “hard commodities” (such as minerals 
and metals) and energy grows as a consequence of investments in infrastructure and 
the expansion of the manufacturing sector.  
 
China’s (and India’s) growth-paths reflect each of these trends. Significantly, it 
reflects the experience of an economy at an early stage in the evolution of this 
growth-path. We can illustrate this by focusing on some of the key parameters of 
China’s recent growth trajectory (see, also, Farooki, 2009). China’s economy has 
shown a rapid transition from agriculture to industry. The share of agriculture in GDP 
fell from 27 percent in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 2008. In the same period, the share of 
industry increased from 42 percent to 49 percent of GDP. This was accompanied by 
large scale rural-urban migration. In 2007, 45 percent of the population (594m) lived 
in urban centers. By 2015 the urban population is projected to rise to 684m, and to 
890m in 2030. This growth in urban population between 2007 and 2030 will exceed 
the total combined population of the US and Europe.  
 
This process of urbanization is reflected in the growth in demand for infrastructure in 
general and new infrastructure and housing in particular. It is one of the reasons 
leading observers to conclude that infrastructure-intensity is highest at the early stages 
of industrialization and at relatively low levels of per capita income (Canning, 1999; 
Auty, 2008). New projects tend to be much more commodity intensive as compared to 
expansion and reconstruction investments (World Bank, 2009). As Table 7 shows, the 
share of new projects in urban fixed investments in China increased from less than a 
third to almost a half between 1995 and 2007.  
 
Table 7: Percent Share of Total Investment in Fixed Assets in Urban Areas by 
Type of Construction in China (1995-2007) 
Year New Construction Expansion Reconstruction Maintenance and Equipment 
1995 30 29 12 29 
2000 32 24 15 29 
2007 44 17 12 27 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
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Second, the growth of China’s manufacturing sector has also made intensive use of 
commodities, particularly hard commodities and energy. To a considerable extent this 
is reflected in the metals and minerals-intensity of China’s rapidly-growing 
manufactured exports which comprised the bulk of exports between 1990 and 2006 
(Figure 3).  
 
As a result of these combined factors, the elasticity of demand for energy and metals 
grew rapidly between the 1990s and the 2000s, and for key resource inputs such as 
coal, pig iron, crude steel and rolled steel, comfortably exceed a value of one (Table 
8). That is, for example, every 1 percent increase in GDP saw a more than 2 percent 
increase in the demand for rolled steel. 
 
Table 8: Elasticity of Energy Consumption and Metal Production in China 
(1991-2005) 
Period Coal Crude Oil Pig Iron Crude 
Steel 
Rolled 
Steel 
1991-1995 0.441 0.569 0.900 0.614 0.958 
2001-2005 1.105 0.832 2.222 2.340 2.545 
Source: Selected from Zhang and Zheng (2008). 
Figure 3: China’s Metal and Minerals Intensive Exports in Total Manufactures 
Exports (1990-2006) 
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Source: Farooki (2009), from COMTRADE data accessed via WITS in November 
2008. The listing of metals-intensive sectors is available in Farooki (2009; Annex 1). 
 
With regard to agricultural inputs, a key component of demand at low per capita 
incomes is that for food products. Studies of urban consumers in China show that the 
income elasticity of demand for food falls from almost unity (0.96) at household 
incomes around Yuan2,500 ($375) p.a., to 0.4 for household incomes of Yuan7,500 
($1,125) and to 0.33 for household incomes of Yuan10,000 ($1,500).2
                                            
2  Adapted from Gale and Huang (2007) 
  Thus, even 
though incomes are growing (and the income elasticity of demand for food is falling), 
there is considerable scope for sustained demand for food, particularly as in 2007, 
around 75 percent of Chinese households had an annual income of less than 
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Yuan38,000 ($5,500) (Figure 5 below). Moreover, as incomes grow, the demand for 
meat expands, and this makes intensive use of grain (approximately four kilos of grain 
are required to produce one kilo of meat, Conceicao and Mendoza, 2009). Thus food-
availability is likely to be of considerable importance in the future in China, not least 
because whilst it has 20 percent of global population China possesses seven percent of 
global arable land.  
 
Figure 4:  Per Capita Consumption of Base Metals 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006. 
 
What these data show is that China’s growth path is particularly commodity-intensive. 
There is nothing exceptional in this resource intensive growth path. It closely reflects 
China’s per capita income, which in 2008 was $5,510 compared to $43,000 for the 
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USA (PPP$). But two factors are worthy of notice. First, as Figure 4 shows, there is 
some way to go in per capita income levels before the resource intensity of growth 
declines. Based on the historic resource intensity of demand for aluminum, copper 
and steel in Korea, Japan, the EU-12 and the US, it seems unlikely that China’s (and 
India’s) demand for minerals and metals will decline in the foreseeable future, despite 
rapid economic growth and rising per capita incomes.  
 
Second, both China and India (as we have seen) are very large economies. Thus, in 
analyzing their impact on global trade we have to suspend the small country 
assumption that no single economy’s trade pattern will shift the structure of global 
trade or the prices at which products are traded. As Table 9 shows, China accounts for 
a rapidly-growing share of global consumption of key base metals and meat, and this 
has led some commentators (including ourselves – Kaplinsky, 2006 and 2009; 
Farooki, 2009) to conclude that at the least this helped explain the boom in 
commodity prices between 2001 and 2008, and perhaps may also play a historically-
significant role in promoting a structural shift in the global commodities-manufactures 
terms of trade in favor of commodities 
 
Table 9: China’s Share of Global Consumption of Base Metals and Meat  
 1990 2000 2007 
Base Metals ( % Share of World Demand)1 
Aluminum 5 13 33 
Zinc 8 15 31 
Lead 7 10 31 
Iron Ore 4 16 48 
Copper 7 12 26 
Food Products (% Share of World Consumption)2 
Poultry 9 18 17 
Pork 35 47 46 
Beef 2 10 12 
Soybeans   40 
Source:1 Macquarie Commodities Research (2008). 
  2 Conceicao and Mendoza (2008). 
4.2. The Nature of Import Demand 
Thus, we have observed that Chinese growth has led to a sharp rise in its share of 
global demand for commodities and perhaps also for a structural upward shift in the 
relative global price of commodities. But there is more that we can observe about 
China’s demand for commodities which is of relevance to global commodity value 
chains feeding into the Chinese economy. The key relevant factors are the demand-
preferences of low-income consumers, the consequent relative insignificance of 
standards in value chains, and the preference for the importation of relatively 
unprocessed products. 
 
17 
4.2.1. The Demand Preferences of Low-Income Consumers 
The median income of individual consumers in the US in 2007 was $26,6253. The 
figure representing the poverty threshold in the UK (defined as 60 percent of average 
(median) annual incomes in 2007) was $35,4324. There is no gainsaying the existence 
of poverty in all of the high-income economies, particularly when poverty is defined 
as a relative income5
 
. There are undoubtedly also cases of significant absolute poverty 
in the north, for example, fuel poverty amongst the aged. However, whatever the 
degrees of inequality and deprivation are in the north, the incomes involved are in 
almost all cases way beyond those earned in low-income economies such as China. 
Figure 5 shows the dispersion of incomes in the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) in 2007. From this it is evident that more than 270m households in 
China and more than 170m households in India had total annual incomes of less than 
$5,000. By contrast, the median household income in 2007 was $50,233 in the US and 
$49,800 in the UK. 
Figure 5: Households According to Disposable Income Bracket in China, India, 
Brazil and Russia '000 households (2002/2007)  
 
Source: Euromonitor International from national statistics, cited in Media Eghbal (2008).  
 
In many cases, these households lived above the minimum $1 per day MDG 
threshold, particularly in China. But the point of significance is that most of these 
households in all of these BRIC economies were cash consumers, that is, they bought 
in a range of products, consumer, intermediate and capital goods. For these 
consumers, price is an overwhelming consideration in consumption. That is not to say 
that they do not care about quality and variety (the two key Drivers of consumer 
demand in northern economies in recent decades – see Section 2 above), but that these 
preferences play a minor role in their consumption choices. Product differentiation 
(variety and quality) gives way to product “commodification” (standardization in 
order to achieve low prices). To the best of our knowledge, this assertion is not 
evidenceable although the idea that low-income markets provide scope for profitable 
                                            
3  Source: US Census Bureau  
4  Source: The Median Income before tax in 2007 was £ 17,700 (HM Revenue and Customs)  
5  As Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show, most indicators of welfare are more affected by 
relative than by absolute poverty levels. However, in this discussion we are not focusing on 
the welfare implications of income levels, but on their translation into the demand 
characteristics of consumption, so it is absolute income levels which draw out attention. 
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production through the sale of low-value items is now widely acknowledged under the 
banner of the “fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad, 2005). 
 
4.2.2. Imported-Inputs Are Not Standards-Intensive 
Following on from the preferences of low-income consumers, there will be derived 
implications for the role which standards play in value chains. In Section 2 (see 
Figure 1) we distinguished between process and product. We observed that there was 
a growing tendency for the standards intensity in value chains to grow, reflecting a 
combination of factors – firm specific concerns with standards (such as Q-C-D) to 
meet consumer needs for product diversity and product quality, government-standards 
to protect consumers, and civil-society-induced standards reflecting growing concerns 
with the ethics of productions systems and their environmental impact. In the context 
of the dominance of (very) low consumer incomes in countries such as China and 
India, each of these Drivers of standards is likely to be of very diminished 
significance (Figure 6). In general, firms are less concerned with product variety, so 
that the imperatives to achieve flexibility through just-in-time production (and hence 
Q-C-D standards) are weak. Governments may either have poorly developed safety 
standards, or fail to implement them effectively. Recent cases in both China (baby 
milk) and India (pesticide in soft drinks) provide striking evidence of this6
 
. Finally, 
the NGOs which have driven public opinion on issues such as FairTrade, labor 
standards and the environment are muted in low-income countries and are likely to 
have little significance with regard to the incorporation of ethical and environmental 
standards in value chains. Indeed, particularly in China, NGOs often have a tenuous 
identity. 
Figure 6: How Important Are Standards Likely to Be in Value Chains Feeding 
into China and India? 
(An elaboration of Figure 1 above) 
 
  Firm Driven Standards Government Driven Standards 
Civil Society Driven 
Standards 
Product 
High-
Income 
Countries 
Quality standards such as 
permitted parts per 
million defects 
Food hygiene standards; 
Lead content in toys 
Organic products 
 
China, 
India 
Low emphasis and weak 
enforcement 
Low emphasis and weak 
enforcement None, or very weak 
Process 
High-
Income 
Countries 
Quality control 
procedures – such as 
ISO9000 
 
Frequency of on-time 
delivery 
Hygiene standards – such 
as Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point 
conformance (HACCP) 
 
Traceability of pesticide 
content 
Sustainability standards 
– such as FSC (Forest 
Stewardship Council) 
(timber) 
 
Child labor standards 
 
China, 
India 
Low emphasis and weak 
enforcement None, or very weak 
Low emphasis and 
weak enforcement 
                                            
6  http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/aug2006/gb20060810_826414.htm 
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4.2.3. The Growth in Imports of Relatively Unprocessed Products 
A key objective of economic and industrial policy in most low-income countries is to 
add value to natural resources: in South Africa, for example, the call is for the 
“beneficiation” of the country’s extensive mineral and agricultural products. Although 
there are dangers to this policy agenda (beneficiation, particularly of hard 
commodities, is often very capital and technology-intensive) there is a natural logic to 
this in many cases. Many commodities degrade rapidly and/or involve significant 
weight loss in processing. There are also evidenced cases of economies which have 
utilized their natural resources to drive forward their industrialization (Wright and 
Czelusta, 2004). And, particularly in the processing of soft commodities, this is often 
a labor-intensive process and wage costs in low-income exporting economies are 
generally a fraction of those in high-income economies. Moreover, commodity 
processing is often very polluting. 
 
This logic of processing at source (rather than in the importing economy) applies 
easily – or relatively easily- when low-income economies export commodities to 
high-income economies. The high-income economies are happy to see the pollution 
and energy intensive production processes located in low-income countries; their 
high-technology, skill-intensive, high-wage and safe working environments in their 
producing sectors are generally more appropriate to the provision of capital and 
intermediate goods for resource-processing industries rather than for the direct 
processing of commodities. However, when low-income resource economies trade 
with low-income importing economies, many of these factors which promote a win-
win division of labor do not apply (Figure 7). Low-income economies care less about 
the polluting nature and energy intensity of processing. Their industrial structures are 
well-pitched in terms of technological and skill intensity to specialize in processing, 
and their low labor costs enable them to do so at similar cost-profiles to those 
operating in low-income exporting economies. 
 
Figure 7: High and Low-Income Commodity Importing Economies – 
Complementarity and Competition with Low-Income Commodity Exporting 
Economies 
 Highincome importing 
economy 
Low-income importing 
economy 
Pollution and energy 
intensity 
 
High preference to 
outsource to exporting 
economy  
Indifferent to location 
Complementary or 
competitive industrial 
structures 
Complementary –focus on 
technologies with high 
barriers to entry 
Competitive – importers 
also have low technology 
industrial structures 
Labor costs High wages militate 
against labor intensive 
processing 
Low wages facilitate 
labor-intensive processing 
Labor standards Working conditions are 
effectively protected by 
enforce legislation 
Weak protective 
environment of working 
conditions 
 
In the case of China and its imports of food products, there is an additional factor 
affecting the degree of processing involved in its imports. We have observed above, 
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that the ratio of China’s population to its arable land suggests that however effective 
its agricultural sector might become, it seems likely that it will have to draw on 
agricultural imports as its economy continues to grow, and as food tastes shift 
increasingly towards meat products. After a brief flirtation with the importation of 
food products, the experience of global shortages of key food crops in 2007 and the 
associated rise in political tension, in countries as diverse as Cameroon and Indonesia, 
has concentrated the minds of Chinese policy makers. In fact, China has pursued a 
strong self-sufficiency policy in grains since 1995, with the objective of domestic 
production meeting 95 percent of its domestic demand (Anderson and Peng, 1998). 
As a consequence, agricultural production shifted towards grains and away from other 
crops such as cotton, sugar beet and soybeans (Fang and Beghin, 1999). Given the 
shortage of land, this has increasingly meant that China’s agricultural imports have 
been concentrated in animal feeds (such as soya and palm oil) and products which 
compete with grains for land-use (such as inputs).  
 
There is another policy-related factor which also affects China’s growing importation 
of agricultural products. In the context of a growing perception of a future energy-
crisis, China has (like other countries such as the US and the EU) begun to promote 
the production of bio-fuels. These need agricultural inputs, but given the primacy 
being given, for political reasons, to food self-sufficiency, China has increasingly 
sought to source the inputs for bio-fuels from abroad as bio-fuel crops are generally 
planted on land used for food crops7
 
.  
5. SHIFTING MARKETS AND LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES’ 
PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
 
The rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrializing economies in the 1970s and 
1980s, and of China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Central America and other emerging 
economies in the 1990s and 2000s was to a significant extent based on the expansion 
of their exports. Incorporated in global value chains, their exports were either directed 
to northern economies, or fed intermediate products into other countries’ exports to 
northern economies.  
 
In Section 3 we reflected on the nature of the post 2008 financial and economic crisis 
and the likely trajectory of the global economy. Even without stagnation and falling 
growth rates in the north, the growth rates of the past two decades in China and India 
are likely to lead to an outcome in which, by virtue of their size, they increasingly 
come to dominate the global economy in the 21st century. However, there are 
persuasive reasons to believe that key large northern economies (notably the US, the 
UK and Spain) will reduce imports as they rebalance their global orientation, given 
their large structural trade and fiscal deficits. This will further accentuate the 
dominance of China, India and other low-income economies in the growth of global 
demand in the coming decades.  
 
                                            
7  Von Braun (2007) estimates if current bio-fuel and investment plans were to carry on, the 
world price by 2020, for major food crops could rise by 11% for cassava, 26% for maize, 18% 
for oilseeds, about 12% for sugar and 8% for wheat 
21 
We believe that this change in the Drivers of global demand – from northern to 
southern economies – will, by hypothesis, have four major sets of implications for 
global value chains in the south arising as a direct consequence of the particular 
characteristics of demand in China and India. First, low levels of per capita incomes, 
coupled with rapid urbanization and the growth of exchange as their economies 
become more diversified, will lead to a sustained growth in their demand for hard and 
soft commodities, both as a source of food and as inputs into infrastructure. Second, 
low levels of per capita incomes mean that the nature of demand will be for cheap, 
undifferentiated goods with low acquisition cost, running against the major trends in 
demand in northern economies after 1970 which increasingly favored differentiated, 
high quality positional products. Third, the standards-intensity of global value chains 
feeding into northern economies has grown significantly and has become much more 
complex and demanding in recent decades. By contrast, global value chains feeding 
southern markets are likely to have much less levels of standards, both in relation to 
products and processes. And, fourth, northern and southern economies are often 
complementary in terms of economic structures. Northern economies have much high 
wages costs and are very much more sensitive to the harmful externalities of polluting 
economic activities than are southern economies, and have increasingly outsourced 
processing to developing economies. By contrast, low-income producing countries 
have similar economic structures and industrial trajectories to low-income economy 
consuming economies, with the prospect of greater competition in the division of 
labor in global value chains. 
 
Evidence from two southern value chains – cassava in Thailand and timber in Gabon 
– provides corroboration for this broad argument (Kaplinsky, Terheggen and Tijaja, 
2010). In both cases, the market has shifted from the EU to China. In both cases, 
broadly speaking, this resulted in a reduction in the degree of value added and in the 
importance of process and product standards. But cassava and timber are relatively 
undifferentiated products, with low degrees of coordination and governance in their 
value chains. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether our hypotheses will also be 
evidenced in value chains historically producing more differentiated products for 
northern markets. We believe – but this belief necessarily requires testing – that the 
nature of the developments which we have sketched out in earlier sections will be 
even more relevant in the case of less commodified products. 
 
What might this mean for meeting development objectives in low-income economies? 
Naturally this is a complex picture, reflecting different sectors and different types of 
low-income economies. There are, however, some general observations which can be 
made. First, on the positive side, enhanced demand from the rapidly growing and very 
large Asian Driver economies provides the potential for a significant income-
enhancing effect, with either an increase in export earnings, or some level of 
compensation for falling exports to the north. A second positive outcome is that there 
is often a link between process and product technologies such that products for low-
income consumers often involve labor-intensive process technologies (Kaplinsky, 
2010). Third, meeting the standards in GVCs serving northern markets generally is 
not just a costly exercise, but requires a literate and numerate labor force and forms of 
management which may be beyond the reach of many small scale enterprises. 
Accessing the Asian Driver markets may therefore be promoting of the role played by 
SMEs in GVCs. 
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On the “dark side”, achieving standards can often contribute to the development of 
upgrading capabilities by the firm, so that exclusion from demanding standards-
intensive markets may undermine the drive to capability-building in the firm. Further, 
from the perspective of both the firm and the economy as a whole, the blocking of 
attempts to deepen value added by advancing along the value chain means that 
producers are likely to be stuck in pockets of static comparative advantage. Moreover, 
being confined to niches of low productivity (for example, value added per worker) is 
likely to undermine the move into the higher value added activities which underwrite 
high incomes. 
 
It is clear from this that there is much ambiguity in outcomes. To some extent this 
ambiguity reflects sector and technological constraints. But it also reflects the way in 
which individual producers and economies respond to these challenges posed by the 
transition in final markets. Will the advance of China and India as the major poles of 
consumption lead to a restructuring of value chains which will be “bad” or “good” for 
development in other low-income economies? Well, that all depends…. 
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